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Abstract
We evaluate whether the impact of EU Structural and Cohesion
Funds (EUF) on Member States’ regional economic growth depends
on the intensity of treatment,measuredby thenormalized amountof
funds distributed in each region.Weuse anoriginal data set that cov-
ers all themain sources of EUFandextend the regression discontinu-
ity design to the case of continuous treatment. The results suggest
an average positive effect on regional growth. The estimated condi-
tional intensity-growth function is concave and presents amaximum
value. Therefore, the exceeding funds could have been allocated to
other lagging regions without reducing the effect on growth.
K EYWORDS
continuous regression discontinuity design, EU Structural andCohe-
sion Funds, intensity of treatment
1 INTRODUCTION
The EU Structural and Cohesion Funds (EUF) represent one of the most important experiments of redistribution of
resources within a continent. EUF aim to reduce disparities among EU Member States and regions countering any
centrifugal forces and helping to develop an area of almost free movement of goods and services. This policy has had
strong supporters and detractors. Some have argued that such a policy was necessary to compensate the most back-
ward regions for thenegative effects that the reductionof barriers to entrywouldhaveon their economies.Conversely,
this policy has sometimes been regarded as a vast waste of resources, with high costs in terms of efficiency and, conse-
quently, in economic growth. The European centralization of this policy, achieved using a common procedure through-
out the EU, also has frequently been criticized as wasteful and inconsistent, reducing its popularity, particularly in the
countries with the highest contributing shares. Indeed, such countries demanded a different approach, with the man-
agement of the policy entrusted to individual governments. Therefore, these positions have unsurprisingly stimulated
many researchers to evaluate the policy's effectiveness. Nevertheless, this substantial amount of empirical studies has
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not brought to a general consensus on the effectiveness of EUF. Although the evaluation techniques have been refined
over time, the lack of harmonized and common data over the long term along with the presence of many confounders
has led to a proliferation of studies divided not only on the method and the data adopted but also, and above all, on
their findings.
We evaluate the impact of EUFonMember States’ regional economic growth from1994 to 2006, verifyingwhether
the uneven impact on regional growth also depends on the intensity of treatment. Our study contributes to the pre-
vious literature in two ways. First, we use an original data set that covers all the main sources of EUF, and it is highly
coherent (EU payments by operational program per year and NUTS-2). The availability of this novel data set allows us
to carry out the analysis with increased precision than it was possible in the past. Second, the evaluation is based on an
extension of the regression discontinuity design (RDD), a quasi-experimental method with strong internal validity and
methodologically close to the HLATE approach developed by Becker, Egger, and von Ehrlich (2013). To our knowledge,
this study is the first to expand the framework of the RDD to the case of continuous treatment.
The high heterogeneity of regional transfer intensity across regions and within the same country suggests that the
intensity of allocated funds between regions is a primary source of variability of the impact. The intensity of EUF trans-
fers is defined as the amount of transfers per inhabitant or as the share of regional GDP at the beginning of the period.
For instance, from 1994 to 2006, the North-Holland region received an annual average per capita transfer close to
€9, whereas the Região Autónoma dos Açores (PT) received almost 85 times more (€773). Limiting the analysis to the
regions with Objective 1 (Ob. 1) status during the period from 1994 to 2006 and excluding sparsely populated regions
that were classified as Ob. 1, the region with the least amount of per capita transfers was the Netherlands’ Flevoland
region, with per capita annual funds amounting to €67.40, 11 times lower than the maximum. The differences in the
intensity of transfers reflect the decision to allocate more resources to those regions that are particularly needy, to
sustain areas experiencing economic and social distress as measured by specific indicators and to maintain qualita-
tive judgment by the EU and individual Member States. Therefore, determining whether the greater intensity of aid is
reflected in improved economic performance is valuable.
The relationship between the aid intensity and the impact of EUF is unclear. Economists and policymakers ignore
whether the marginal efficiency of transfers is constant or increasing or decreasing in some parts of the relation-
ship. If we assume that it is decreasing after a certain point, then the maximum desirable level of transfers is defined
as the amount of aid per person after which the effect of EUF transfers on economic growth turns negligible. Sev-
eral arguments can justify the presence of a concavity in the dose–response function (DRF) of the EUF transfers. The
assumption of diminishing returns to investment (and to subsidized investments) clearly implies that more invest-
ment projects would be associated with a lower return on investments or transfers. In this case, after a determined
level of EUF transfers no additional or even lower per capita income growth effects would be generated (Becker,
Egger, & von Ehrlich, 2012). However, the effect of diminishing returns can differ across the least developed Euro-
pean regions, depending on the stage of development, the quality and quantity of social capital, and the potential
demand.
A different reason is the limited absorptive capacity of EUF transfers, particularly in less developed countries and
regions, which affects the maximization of the investments occurring in their territory. This reason would imply that
some regions use EU transfers increasingly inefficiently as they receive more money. Several authors and the Euro-
pean Commission attribute this effect to a lack of administrative capacity and quality of institutions. The EU claims
that poor institutions can undermine efforts to achieve greater economic cohesion and hinder the effectiveness of
regional development strategies, as stated in the EU's Fifth Cohesion Report (2010). Rodríguez-Pose and Garcilazo
(2015) demonstrate that poor institutional quality may be at the root of declining returns of regional development
funds in Europe as the transfer intensity increases. Finally, a large amount of EUF can be used as a substitute, and not
as a complement, to national or regional funds, decreasing the total impact of EUF on regional growth. Becker et al.
(2012) suggest a similar explanation for a minimum necessary level of regional transfers that is based on the big-push
or poverty-trap theory of development, which states that transfers or aid must exceed a certain threshold to become
effective. For instance, this situation would apply if the marginal product of capital were extremely low at inadequate
levels of infrastructure or human capital.
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These arguments have direct implications for policymakers. In a time of budget cuts, knowing that some regions are
subsidized excessively can be helpful for a reallocation of transfers with positive effects on overall growth. Further-
more, this informationmay be highly important to recalibrate the system of transfers andmaximize its efficiency.
Although the literature on the impact evaluation of the EUF is very broad (see, among others, Becker, Egger, & von
Ehrlich, 2010;Dall'Erba&Fang, 2017; Esposti &Bussoletti, 2008;Giua, 2017; Pellegrini, Terribile, Tarola,Muccigrosso,
& Busillo, 2013), we know of only four papers that evaluate the effects of transfer intensity. Mohl and Hagen (2010)
demonstrate that EUF payments “have a positive, but not statistically significant, impact on EU regions’ growth rates.”
Conversely, Becker et al. (2012) estimate the relationship between the treatment intensity of EUF transfers and per
capita growth for the programming periods 1994–1999 and 2000–2006 at NUTS-3 level. They find that these trans-
fers enable faster overall growth in the recipient regions as intended, but the transfer intensity exceeds the aggregate
efficiency maximizing level in 36 percent of the recipient regions and a reduction of transfers would not even reduce
growth in 18 percent of the regions. Becker, Egger, and von Ehrlich (2016) investigate the 2007–2013 programming
period using an updated set of outcome variables, including education and innovation outcomes. Their findings are
generally positive and suggest that regions generally tend to benefit frombalanced funding of activities unless they are
extremely specialized ex ante. From a methodological perspective, all these papers use “generalized propensity score”
(GPS)matching (Hirano& Imbens, 2004; Imai&VanDijk, 2004), a nonparametricmethod to estimate treatment effects
conditional on observable determinants of treatment intensity. Finally, Bouayad-Agha, Turpin, and Védrine (2013),
using a spatial dynamic panel data analysis, find that EUF facilitated the convergence of Ob. 1 regions to average EU
income levels, while the overall effect of EUFwas negligible.
All the estimators based on thematching approach suffer from the strong heterogeneity of regions, which is hardly
captured by the observed covariates. In this context, it is difficult to maintain the main assumption behind the GPS
that selection into levels of the treatment is random, conditional on a set of observable pretreatment characteristics.1
Moreover, none of these papers have properly exploited the source of local randomness due to the sharp discontinuity
in the assignment of different transfer intensity. In fact, the majority of the funds accrue to Ob. 1 regions, i.e., to the
less developed regions with per capita GDP (in purchasing power standards) below 75 percent of the EU average. Our
study proposes an alternative solution which exploits the above discontinuity by using the continuous RDD, which for
the first time allows a compelling evaluation strategy also in the presence of a continuous treatment. From a method-
ological point of view, our approach extends the procedure proposed by Becker et al. (2013) for RDD with heteroge-
neous treatment effects to the case of continuous treatment. The results suggest that EUF had an average positive
effect on regional growth. The estimated conditional intensity-growth function is concave and presents a maximum
value. Therefore, the exceeding funds could have been allocated to other lagging regions without reducing the effect
on growth.
The rest of the paper is organized as follows. In the next section, we present details on the construction of data at
the NUTS-2 regions level for the two programming periods 1994–1999 and 2000–2006. In Section 3, we discuss the
econometric methodology applied for the identification of causal effects of the EU's regional transfers on economic
growth. We present the results and interpret the findings in Section 4 and report the robustness checks in Section 5.
The last section concludes with a summary of themost important findings.
2 DATA AND SAMPLE
2.1 Data
This study is based on a new, reliable, and comparable data set, stemming from several sources. As we do not consider
the accession countries in 2004 that did not receive transfers before 2004, the spatial grid used in our work is defined
1 Although the GPS approach should be able to correct for selection bias into different levels of treatment intensity by comparing units that are similar in
terms of their observable characteristics, it does not have testable implications (Yang, Imbens, Cui, Faries, & Kadziola, 2016).
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by 208 EU-15 regions at level 2 of the NUTS classification. We use the NUTS 2006 classification with adjustments to
include data from the 1994–1999 programming period:
- Considering the 2003 and 2006 amendments to the NUTS 1999 classification, regions that experienced any “split”
from 1999 to 2003 and/or from 2003 to 2006 are included in the NUTS 1999 classification (Brandenburg in Ger-
many; Ceuta yMelilla in Spain; and Trentino-Alto Adige in Italy);
- NUTS-2 regions that experienced any “merge” from 1999 to 2003 and/or from 2003 to 2006 are included as in the
NUTS 2006 classification (Sachsen-Anhalt in Germany);
- NUTS-2 regions that experienced any merge and split together from 1999 to 2003 and/or from 2003 to 2006 are
considered to be in the NUTS 2006 classification (three Portuguese regions and three Finnish regions);
- Denmark is presented as a single NUTS-2 region (following the NUTS 1999 and 2003 classifications).
Data on EUF payments to Member States, broken down by programming period (1994–1999, 2000–2006) and
region per year, have been provided by the European Commission-DG REGIO, and the final data set is the result of
a joint work involving the European Commission-DG REGIO together with external experts. The originality and rel-
evance of this data set arises from its internal coherence (EU payments by operational program per year and NUTS-
2) and extensiveness (it covers all the main funds, including the Cohesion Fund, the European Regional Development
Fund (ERDF), the European Social Fund (ESF), the European Agricultural Guidance and Guarantee Fund (EAGGF), and
the Financial Instrument for Fisheries Guidance (FIFG)). Note that only data on EUF are considered, without national
cofinancing and private funds. However, national cofinancing tends to be proportionate to EU funding and therefore
may not substantially change the relative amount of funding distributed to different regions. The procedures adopted
and themethodologies used for cleaning and the integration of different data sets are described in Roemisch (2016).
We link these data with information on various regional characteristics from Eurostat and Cambridge Economet-
rics’ Regional Databases for our empirical analysis. The data cover the years 1994 through 2007.2 We consider the
compounded annual growth rate of per capita real GDP at NUTS-2 level as the main outcome variable of interest.
Nevertheless, we also consider the compounded annual growth rate of real gross value added (GVA), the employment
growth rate, and the labor productivity growth rate (real GVA per hour worked) as alternative outcome variables. To
use a unique source of information, data are taken fromCambridge Econometrics’ Regional Database (consistent with
Eurostat data but more complete).
The regional databasesofCambridgeEconometrics andEurostatwere themain sourcesof thepretreatment covari-
atesused in theanalysis: theoverall population, thepopulationdensity, the shareof thepopulationover65, theemploy-
ment rate in those aged 15–64, labor productivity, and the share of employment in the service sector and in the agri-
cultural sector.
2.2 Sample
Due to the limited changes to the Ob. 1 status assignment across regions between the two programming periods3
analyzed and to the significant time shift in payments, we decided to consider the entire 1994–2006period in ourmain
analysis.Weadopt a fuzzyRDDas therewasnotperfect compliancewith theOb.1assignment rule. Indeed, fourNUTS-
2 regions had a level of per capitaGDP in the period 1988–1990 (i.e., the reference period for the determination ofOb.
1 eligibility by the European Commission) above 75 percent of the EU average but were included in Ob. 1 for “political
2 We also collected data for the next programming period (2007–2013). However, we decided to exclude this period from our analysis because of the higher
heterogeneity across regions, due to the entrance of new Member States in EU, having strong structural differences from the EU-15 countries and to the
presence of the largest economic crisis in Europe sinceWWII, affecting the responses of each region to EUF.
3 In the robustness section, we test whether these changes of Ob. 1 status (e.g., Corse in France and Lisboa in Portugal were phased out from Ob. 1 status in
the 2000–2006 programming period) significantly affect our estimates.
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reasons”:4 Prov. Hainaut (BE), Corse (FR), Molise (IT), and Lisboa (PT). In the fuzzy RDD, the Ob. 1 assignment rule
serves as an instrument for actual Ob. 1 treatment. Therefore, our full data set consists of 208 regions—58 “treated”
and 150 “nontreated.”
Consistent with the RDD approach, we selected a restricted sample including the regions closest to the discontinu-
ity. To maintain a sufficient number of degrees of freedom, we have eliminated the lowest quarter for treated regions
(in terms of initial level of per capita GDP) and the upper quarter for the nontreated regions. Moreover, two regions
(Aragón in Spain and Dytiki Makedonia in Greece) were clear outliers and were dropped from the restricted sample.5
The restricted sample then includes 156 regions, where 44 were “treated” and 112 “nontreated.” This smaller sample
will be used for themain part of the analysis.6
The normalization of the EU regional payments is an important question. A normalization is needed as the Euro-
pean Commission allocates EUF for eachMember State on the basis of a financial allocation per inhabitant per year, to
be applied to the population living in the eligible regions (Barbieri & Pellegrini, 1999). From the preceding descrip-
tion, the average population by region at the beginning of the programming period seems the “natural” normaliza-
tion variable and we use it in the main analysis. However, as previous studies have used the beginning of period GDP
(Becker et al., 2012; Mohl & Hagen, 2010) because this share is a clear minimum target of the impact of EUF on the
economy, we adopt this alternative normalization to check the robustness of the findings and report the results in the
Appendix.
In Figure 1, we present the distribution of EUF intensity by region using both normalizations (the population
in 1994 and the level of GDP at constant prices in 1994), sorted by the 1988–1990 per capita GDP (our forcing
variable). The regions included in Ob. 1 for “political reasons” are displayed in orange, and the two outliers are in
green. The figure indicates that, although the line of discontinuity identifies the two groups of treated and non-
treated regions, the two-stage assignment mechanism behind the distribution of EUF (see Bodenstein & Kemmerling,
2011) makes some non-Ob. 1 regions receive a per capita amount of funds similar or slightly above than few Ob. 1
regions. The normalization moderately affects the differences between the two groups. As expected, the variability
of the intensity is slightly lower for the variable normalized with respect to the GDP, particularly for the nontreated
regions.
Figure 2 presents the geographical position of treated and nontreated regions in the EU-15: the standard core-
periphery picture is clearly exhibited, with the treated regions mostly in the periphery. Because this study focuses on
the intensity distribution among European regions, Figure 3 displays the geographical location of the regions with dif-
ferent deciles of treatment intensity (EUFbypopulation) in theEU. In this figure, the core-peripherypicture is less clear,
indicating that several factors influenced the EUF regional intensity. In particular, the quality of the regional adminis-
tration and the regional development strategies are crucial determinants of the outcome of the bargaining between
national and regional authorities.
The distribution of the normalized EUF intensity is an important question, as the possibility of getting meaningful
estimates depends on the variability of the normalized EUF intensity and the shape of its distribution. In Figure 4, we
present an estimation using a standard kernel approach of the distribution for treated and nontreated regions, using
the full and restricted samples. The intensity indicates a substantial variability between the two groups, and the shape
of the distributions typically appears as a single mode and fat tails. As expected, the distribution is more concentrated
4 The procedure for funds allocation has not always been automatically determined and transparent. Political negotiations amongMember States have often
influenced the allocation of the EU budget. Consequently, in the different programming periods, a number of regions have been entitled to receive assistance
within theOb. 1 framework, even if they did not comply with the criterion set in the regulations (Pellegrini et al., 2013).
5 Aragón is in the nontreated group, whereasDytikiMakedonia is in the treated one. The criterion for outliers is to have received funds above the average plus
three times the standard deviation of the respective treatment group in the restricted sample, excluding the lowest quarter for treated regions (in terms of
initial level of per capita GDP) and the upper quarter for the nontreated regions. As we look at the maximum desirable intensity of payments, the removal of
the treated region receiving the highest intensity of paymentsmight seem counterintuitive. Nevertheless, given the highweight thatOLS estimators assign to
extreme values, even the presence of only one outlier has the potential of greatly influencing the results.
6 The NUTS-2 level was adopted due to the very limited reliability of data at higher spatial disaggregation for the programming periods under analysis. For
instance, even at the NUTS-3 level, the basic information on the geographic allocation of the EUF payments is the product of a mere estimation procedure in
which the aggregated EUF data are artificially distributed among the NUTS-3 regions.
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F IGURE 1 EUF intensity by NUTS-2 regions [Color figure can be viewed at wileyonlinelibrary.com]
when the sample size is reduced.No significant differences exist between thedistributions of the normalized intensity7
and there is an apparently modest area of overlap.
Table 1 compares treated and nontreated regions with respect to different variables in the initial and final years
of the research period. We also present the comparison in the large and restricted samples. Nontreated regions are
7 This aspect is very important in our approach because we compare the treatment intensity between treated and nontreated regions in terms of differences
of treatment by the average in their group. If the distribution of the treatment intensity is similar between treated and nontreated regions with a smaller
difference in the mean level, comparing such intensity is possible for most levels of treatment. Moreover, in this case once the treatment is controlled for, the
differences in intensity can be thought as random, as it is assumed in ourmodel.
CERQUA AND PELLEGRINI 7
F IGURE 2 Eligible areas and treated and nontreated regions [Color figure can be viewed at wileyonlinelibrary.com]
generally smaller but more populated than the treated ones. As expected, they are richer and more productive. Still,
the average per capita GDP growth is lower than that of the treated regions. As expected, the differences are smaller
in the restricted sample than in the full sample. The balancing test reported in the last column of Table 1 shows that
there are no significant differences between treated and untreated regions at the threshold.
3 THE IMPACT OF CONTINUOUS TREATMENT IN AN RDD FRAMEWORK
Our data set on EUF transfers presents a discontinuity in the 1988–1990 per capita GDP, which allows using a quasi-
experimental method deriving from an RDD approach (Hahn, Todd, & van der Klaauw, 2001; Thistlethwaite & Camp-
bell, 1960). This approach enables us to identify the causal effect of transfers on regional growth performances at
the threshold in case of binary treatment. Our idea is to extend the RDD to the case of continuous treatment, con-
sidering intensity to be a cause of the impact heterogeneity. When the treatment is continuous, treatment effects are
affected by the treatment level, the heterogeneity among the units, and the stochastic component. Apart from the
error term, the heterogeneity issue can be interpreted in two ways. First, the effects may vary among units for each
level of treatment. This is the covariate heterogeneity problem in the literature of program evaluation with binary
treatment, depending on the characteristics of each unit (see Becker et al., 2013; Percoco, 2017). Instead, this study
focuses on another source of heterogeneity: the differences in the effects across levels of treatment. This source of
variability is handled by evaluating the average effect among units treated at different levels around the discontinu-
ity. As in our study the number of observations is finite and limited, the heterogeneity in the covariates can dominate
the heterogeneity in the level of treatment. Accordingly, we propose to combine designs and assume that, after con-
ditioning on the observable variables affecting treatment assignment and the EUF intensity, treatment assignment (in
8 JOURNALOF REGIONAL SCIENCE
F IGURE 3 Regional distribution of the EUF (Intensity = EUF/Population) [Color figure can be viewed at wileyon-
linelibrary.com]
F IGURE 4 Kernel densities by treatment group [Color figure can be viewed at wileyonlinelibrary.com]
differences from the mean for the treated and the nontreated sample) is as-if randomized for those regions near the
Ob. 1 assignment threshold. Therefore, our approach is a combined design, where we consider heterogeneity in RDD
after conditioning for pre-treatment covariates.8
The following simple representation describes the EUF framework:we assume two forms of treatment status (S)—a
status with a high level of treatment (Sh) and a status with a low level of treatment (Sl). The treatment for each status
8 Although it is adopted in a different framework, a similar approach is presented in Keele, Titiunik, and Zubizarreta (2015).
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varies in a continuous way around its mean, with the condition E(Sh) > E(Sl). The level of treatment t is defined as the
difference from themean for each status: th = Sh − E(Sh) and tl = Sl − E(Sl).
The common potential outcome approach in a continuous treatment framework can be applied to our context: yi(T)
represents the set of potential outcomes, for each region i, given a random sample indexed by i = 1…N, and T repre-
sents the continuous variable indicating the treatment level ti. The realized outcome yi can bewritten as:
yi = diyi(D = 1, ti) + (1 − di)yi(D = 0, ti), (1)
where D is the dummy variable indicating the treatment status (D = 1 if the region is in the status with a high level
of treatment, and D = 0 if the region is in the status with a low level of treatment), and yi(ti) is the particular potential
outcome for each status at theobserved level ti . Theaverage treatment effect on the treatedat the tth level is estimated
as:
𝛼(t) = E[Y(D = 1) − Y(D = 0)|T = t]. (2)
The parameter 𝛼(t) can be defined as the average treatment level effect (ATLE) (see Adorno, Bernini, & Pellegrini,
2007). However, our analysis is focused on the effect of ti on yi . In an RDD framework, the outcome yi is a function of
the treatment di, of the forcing variables xi, and of the level of treatment ti. Our estimate of the ATLE is local in the
sense that it applies to the neighborhood of the forcing variable threshold x0, for every given ti. We define the local
ATLE (LATLE):
LATLE(xi = x0, ti) = LATLE(x0, ti) = E[y1i|x0, ti = th] − E[y0i|x0, ti = tl], (3)
where y1i denotes the outcome with high treatment, y0 i the outcome with low treatment, ti = th = tl the same devia-
tion from the average intensity of the respective treatment status S and x0 denotes the threshold value of the forcing
variable. The expected value of yi to changes in ti given x = x0 is the DRF of yi to ti at the threshold:
DRF(ti|x = x0) = E[yi|x0 , ti]. (4)
In our case, the DRF relates each value of the EUF intensity to the compounded annual growth rate of per capita
real GDP from 1994 to 2007. The estimation of the LATLE and the DRF in an RDD framework requires three different
identifying assumptions. These assumptions adapt the HLATE framework proposed by Becker et al. (2013) to the case
of continuous treatment:
A1. Continuity of outcomes at the threshold: E(y1i) and E(y0i) are continuous at x0.
This expression is the standard identifying assumption in the RDD framework: every jump at the threshold must be
attributed only to the forcing variable.
A2. Continuity of treatment intensity at the threshold: The treatment level ti is continuous at the threshold x0.
Assumption A2 allows identifying the effect of the treatment, based on the average treatment intensity, and the
effect of the intensity of the treatment, measured as the difference from the mean, for the treated (ti = th) and the
untreated regions (ti = tl), with ti = th = tl. The average jump is attributed to the difference in the average intensity of
treatment between treated and not treated regions at the threshold.9
A3. Random assignment of treatment intensity conditional on the forcing variable and the covariates at the threshold:
the variable ti is uncorrelatedwith the error term in the outcome equation, conditional on xi and covariates Zi at the threshold.
9 The plot of the treatment intensity distribution reported in Figure 6 in the next section indicates that assumption A2 is satisfied by the data.
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The assumption states that the treatment intensity (measured as the difference from themean), conditioned on the
forcing variables and other covariates, is randomly distributed between treated and not treated regions. The impor-
tant condition is that treated and untreated regions with the same level of treatment ti = th = tl (in differences from
the mean) are not different by some unobservable dimension. The condition is similar to the condition of weak uncon-
foundedness (CIA) in a GPS framework (Hirano & Imbens, 2004), but it is circumscribed around the threshold.10
In our context, this assumption states that, conditional on per capita GDP in the period 1988–1990, regions with
different levels of treatment around the threshold do not differ in unobserved variables that are relevant for regional
GDP growth. Even around the threshold, in case of a small sample, this condition can require some adjustment for
baseline covariates. Therefore, the LATLE is estimated as:
LATLE(x0, ti) = E[y1i|x0 , ti, Zi] − E[y0i|x0, ti, Zi], (5)
where Zi is a set of baseline covariates. We assume that Zi captures the characteristics relevant to the probability of
receiving relative high or low treatment intensity. Therefore, after controlling for these observable characteristics, any
remaining difference in treatment intensity ti across regions is independent of the potential outcome yi.
The same holds for the DRF:11
DRF(ti|x = x0, Zi) = E[yi|x = x0, ti, Zi]. (6)
Nowwe define the parametric control function for the LATLE identification.We start from the “classic” RDD frame-
work:12
Y = a + b0 (x) + g ∗ D + b1 (x) ∗ D, (7)
where Y is the compounded annual growth rate of per capita real GDP, x is the forcing variable (average per capita
GDP in the 1988–1990 period), andD is the treatment dummy, when b0(.) and b1(.) are sufficiently smooth polynomial
functions of x.
Assuming that the impact g(.) of the treatment is heterogeneous and depends on t, the relative intensity of treat-
ment (expressed in difference from themean) is:
Y = a + b0 (x) + g (t) ∗ D + b1 (x) ∗ D. (8)
Using a polynomial approximation for the term g(t) ∗ D, we have:
Y = a + b0 (x) + g0 (t) + g1D + g2 (t) ∗ D + b1 (x) ∗ D, (9)
where g0(.) and g2(.) are a sufficiently smooth polynomial functions of t.
In case of a large sample, the heterogeneity would not be a problem for the RDD. However, in our finite sample, we
cannot exclude that differences in intensities reflect differences in sample characteristics also around the threshold. As
such, we combine identification strategies and assume that, after conditioning on covariates, treatment relative level is
locally randomized for those regions close to the threshold. Thus, we propose a mixed design, which exploits the RDD
and conditions on the observables (Z) at the same time:
Y = a + b0 (x) + g0 (t) + g1D + g2 (t) ∗ D + b1 (x) ∗ D + h (Z) . (10)
10 For the use of the CIA in an RDD framework, see Angrist and Rokkanen (2016).
11 For the correct identification of theDRF, assumptions A1 andA3 are sufficient. It is also possible to representing theDRFwith respect to the absolute value
of the intensity instead of the difference between the intensity and the intensity average of the corresponding treatment group.
12 Althoughwe adopt the fuzzy RDD in the paper, here we outline the case of sharp RDD to avoid cumbersome notation.
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Our approach can be explained in two different ways. The first explanation is that we are estimating the intensity
effect around the “average treatment impact.” We exploit variation in intensity for treated and nontreated regions
around theaverage treatmenteffect for bothgroups.Defining the “averageornormal effects of treatment given covari-
ates” (Yn), which includes the discontinuity, as:
Yn = a + b0 (x) + g1D + b1 (x) ∗ D + h (Z) , (11)
where a includes the average intensity effect when the treatment is low, and g1 includes the difference in effect
between the average low and high level of treatment, the conditioned effect of intensity is given by the difference
from the “average effect of the treatment given the covariates”:
Y − Yn = g0 (t) + g2 (t) ∗ D. (12)
The second explanation is inside the Becker et al. (2013) framework. Intensity can be considered one of the vari-
ables explaining theheterogeneityof theLATE.However, our approach is different in theuseof covariatesZ:we change
assumptionA3 inBecker's paper (i.e., randomassignment of the interaction variable conditional on xi), where the inter-
action variable (i.e., the relative level of treatment in our study) is uncorrelated with the error term in the outcome
equation, conditional on xi (the forcing variable). Our framework assumes the relative level of treatment ti is uncorre-
lated with the error term conditional on xi and the covariates Zi.
4 RESULTS
In an RDD analysis, it is recommended to represent the relationship between the forcing variable and the outcome
with a graph to visually highlight the presence of a discontinuity (Lee & Lemieux, 2010). In our case, the problem is
more complex because three variables are of interest, including the intensity of the treatment. We then produce a
three-dimensional graph reported in Figure 5 presenting the relationship between the outcome variable (i.e., the com-
pounded annual growth rate of per capita real GDP for 1994–2007), the forcing variable (i.e., the level of per capita
GDP in PPS, EU-15 = 100) by region on either side of the cut-off (i.e., 75 percent of the EU average per capita GDP in
PPS for 1988–1990), and the intensity.
In Figure 5, treated (i.e., Ob. 1) and nontreated regions are sharply separated. The surfaces represent quadratic
lowess functions (using a bi-square weight function and a bandwidth of 0.8) of the natural log of the forcing variable
and the EUF transfers intensity. These functions are estimated separately on both sides of the threshold.
The graphs indicate the typical shape of the RDD. On average, Ob. 1 regions demonstrate higher growth rates than
other EU-15 regions, and this tendency is represented in the graph by a clear discontinuity. However, given our interest
in the relationship between intensity and growth, the most interesting aspect of the figure is the concavity that it is
created in the surface along the intensity axis. The relationship between intensity and growth is steady at first and then
increases among the nontreated regions, but it increases to a maximum and then decreases for treated regions. The
figure then reveals how the effect of the intensity on treated regions has an internal maximum. This finding suggests
that amaximum desirable amount of aid exists, which can be identified by the parametric model described above.
Disregarding the forcing variable, the relationship between the intensity of aid and growth can also be depicted on
a two-dimensional plane. Figure 6 clearly indicates the different patterns of this relationship among treated and non-
treated regions. For the nontreated regions displayed on the left side, the effect is first constant and then increasing;
among the treated regions, the curvature underlined before is clear only in the restricted sample. The extreme values
beyond the space bounded by the restricted sample appear as outliers compared to the basic relationship. This result is
likely due to the peculiarities of these regions, which are either very underpopulated or very deprived—characteristics
thatmight influence their poor growth. The relationship betweenpopulation and intensity also displays a negative sign,
suggesting the presence of a reward for the smallest regions (see Figure B1 in the Appendix).
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F IGURE 5 Relationship among the forcing variable, theGDPper capita growth rate and theEUF Intensity (restricted
sample) [Color figure can be viewed at wileyonlinelibrary.com]
Note: This figure illustrates the relationship between GDP per capita growth rate (1994–2007), forcing variable and
EU funds intensity. The solid (hollow) dots indicate regions that were considered (were not considered) Ob. 1 regions.
The surfaces represent quadratic lowess functions (using a bi-square weight function and a bandwidth of 0.8) of the
forcing variable and subsidy intensity. These functions are estimated on both sides of the threshold separately. Regions
included in Ob. 1 for “political reasons” have been omitted.
F IGURE 6 GDPper capita growth rate and the EUF Intensity (full and restricted sample) [Color figure can be viewed
at wileyonlinelibrary.com]
Note: Histogram-style conditional mean with 30 bins by Ob. 1 status obtained using the Stata module “cmogram.ado.”
For the interpolation line we used a local linear smoothing function.
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We thenmove to the parametric estimation of the continuous fuzzy RDD, adapting the model presented in Section
3. Different order polynomials of the forcing variable can be introduced as regressors in the model to allow different
nonlinear specifications of the relationship between the outcome and the forcing variable on both sides of the cut-off
point. Therefore, the presence of a discontinuity in the relationship between GDP growth and EUF transfers intensity
at the threshold cannot be attributed to a missing nonlinearity but exclusively to the Ob. 1 treatment. Accordingly,
we use a third-order polynomial for the forcing variable where the parameters are allowed to differ to the right of
the threshold from the left.13 We additionally conditioned the equations to the following pretreatment covariates:
the overall population; the population density; the share of population over age 65; the employment rate for those
15–64 years old; labor productivity; and the share of employment in the service sector and in the agricultural sector.
Some of these variables control for idiosyncrasies among regions, while others are strongly linked to the determinants
behind the assignment process of EUF. In fact, regional prosperity, national prosperity, and the relative severity of the
structural problems are the most relevant determinants of transfer intensity (Barbieri & Pellegrini, 1999). Their use
strengthens the plausibility of our identifying assumptions, improves the efficiency of the RDD estimator in a small
sample, and mitigates concerns over the self-selection between small neighborhoods across treated and not treated
areas.
Table 2 presents the estimates using the intensity expressed as differences from themeans. In these equations, the
treatment dummy coefficient also captures the effect of the average intensity. Note that the treatment effect is posi-
tive and highly significant and that the intensity parameters are always jointly statistically significant at the 5 percent
level, indicating the importance of EUF transfers intensity forGDPgrowth.We also relate the treatment dummy to the
EUF intensity, allowing a different effect of intensity for treated and not treated regions. In this case, we have a fully
specifiedmodel (column 5), which is our preferred specification.
In the case of the fully specified model, there is a positive impact of the EUF on the annual GDP growth of treated
regions which is increasing with respect to the EUF transfers intensity but only up to a certain value. For example,
the average annual per capita transfer in treated regions (restricted sample) is approximately €224. If we increase
the transfers by 50 percent, the impact is substantially higher (1.8 ppts), while if we double the transfers the impact
decreases to 0.9 ppts.
A simple way to graphically represent our results is to draw the curve described by the intensity coefficients of our
models. Using the estimates from the fully specified model (eq. 10), the upper panel of Figure 7 indicates the average
DRF of the compounded annual growth rate of per capita real GDP and the EUF transfers intensity, and the treatment
effect function (the marginal effect of on unit of treatment, i.e., the first partial derivative of DRF) by Ob. 1 status,
both for different level of treatment intensity and with the 90 percent confidence bands. The lower panel of Figure 7
presents the LATLE estimates both in absolute value (they directly derive from the estimates reported in Table 2) and
in percent values (they report the LATLE graph we would obtain using the difference in percent value of the intensity
between treated and nontreated regions instead of the difference in absolute values).14 Figure 7 demonstrates that
the dependent variable is an increasing function of the transfer intensity. The compounded annual growth rate of per
capita real GDP is positive for each value of the intensity. For instance, a EUF intensity of €150 leads to a compounded
annual growth rate of per capita real GDP of 2.7 percent, and a EUF intensity of €200 leads to an average GDP per
capita growth rate of 3.2 percent. This result implies that the local average causal effect of increasing the EUF intensity
from €150 to €200 is 3.2− 2.7= 0.5 percentage points, i.e., a 33 percent increase in EUF intensity causes a 19 percent
increase in compounded annual growth rate of per capita real GDP for Ob. 1 NUTS-2 regions. However, the positive
impact of the intensity on Ob. 1 NUTS-2 regions’ growth is decreasing and it becomes statistically negligible after a
13 Using the second- or the fourth-order polynomials in the forcing variable leads to quantitatively similar estimates.
14 The LATLE estimates in absolute value are affected by a dimensionality issue due to the large difference in EUF intensity between Ob. 1 and non-Ob. 1
regions. Indeed, an extra €50 for nontreated regions represent an increase in EUF transfers intensity of almost 1.5 times the average, while for the treated
regions such increase is much more limited (0.2 times the average). Moreover, the dimensionality aspect affects also the common support that is necessarily
reduced. To enlarge the common support and to check the validity of the LATLE estimates in absolute value, we compute the LATLE estimates also in per-
cent values, as the use of differences in percent values substantially limits the aforementioned dimensionality issue. As the LATLE functions take on a similar
functional form, we argue that this additional analysis backs up the hypothesis of the presence of amaximum desirable intensity.
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TABLE 2 Continuous fuzzy RDD parametric estimates: Deviation from groupmeans (Intensity= EUF/Population)
Dependent variable: GDP per capita compound growth rate, 1994–2007
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5)
Dummy Treatment (D) 0.266 0.786 0.910 0.730 1.135
(0.394) (0.597) (0.562) (0.728) (0.770)
Intensity – – 0.0046 0.0079 −0.0099
(0.0023)** (0.0025)*** (0.0053)*
Intensity Squared – – – −0.00003 0.0008
(0.0002) (0.0002)***
Intensity Cubic – – – −1.36e-07 −6.18e-06
(9.15e-08) (2.04e-06)***
Intensity*D – – – – 0.0187
(0.0056)***
Intensity Squared*D – – – – −0.0008
(0.0002)***
Intensity Cubic*D – – – – 5.99e-06
(2.04e-06)***
Polynomial order forcing variable 1 3 3 3 3
Other covariates Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Intensity parameters jointly stat. sign. (5% level) – – Yes Yes Yes
Maximum desirable intensity (stat. sign.) N/A N/A N/A €280 €275
Maximum desirable intensity (point est.) N/A N/A N/A €310 €305
R-squared 0.1196 0.1083 0.1635 0.2520 0.3196
Nb. of treated regions 44 44 44 44 44
Nb. of nontreated regions 112 112 112 112 112
Note: Clustered standard errors at the country level in parentheses. The polynomial functions are allowed to have different
parameters to the left and the right of the threshold. The estimates are based on the 75% of the sample closest to the Ob. 1
assignment threshold (we exclude the lower quarter for the treated regions and the higher quarter for the nontreated regions).
Other covariates include population, population density, percentage of over 65, share in the service sector, share in the agri-
cultural sector, productivity, and employment rate among 15–64 years old, with all covariates measured in 1994.
***P< 0.01, **P< 0.05, *P< 0.1.
certain threshold. Thus, evidence suggests thatNUTS-2 regions receiving lower EUF intensity aremuchmore sensitive
to EUF intensity changes thanNUTS-2 regions receiving higher EUF intensity levels and that additional transfers after
a certain intensity threshold do not increase GDP.
Similar to Becker et al. (2012), we compute the maximum desirable EUF intensity for eachmodel both with respect
to the statistical significance of the treatment effect estimates and to their point estimates. For instance, using the fully
specified model the maximum desirable EUF intensity is €305 for the point estimate (€275 for the statistical signifi-
cance). Themaximumdesirable intensity estimates for eachmodel are reported to Table 2. Note that based on Figure 7
we cannot ignore that the marginal effect of the treatment is constant and equal to zero after the maximum desirable
EUF intensity.
Although our analysis is mainly focused on the effect of EUF on the per capita GDP growth rate, EU transfers might
also affect other important variables such as income inequality, social cohesion, employment, and productivity. As we
have access to some of these variables, in Table 3 we report the fully specified model estimates for the compounded
annual growth rate of real GVA, the employment growth rate, and the labor productivity growth rate, all computed
for the 1994–2007period. The results concerningGVAand employment confirm the presence of amaximumdesirable
level of transfers and suggest that suchmaximum ishigher than forGDP for thesevariables (€340 for thepoint estimate
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F IGURE 7 The effect of treatment intensity on regional growth (fully specifiedmodel)
Note: (Left panel) Average dose–response function and 90% confidence bands by Ob. 1 status for the GDP per capita
compound growth rate; (Right panel): Average treatment effect function and 90% confidence bands byOb. 1 status for
the GDP per capita compound growth rate; (Lower panel): LATLE and 90% confidence bands limited to the common
support betweenOb. 1 and non-Ob. 1 regions [Color figure can be viewed at wileyonlinelibrary.com]
and €315 for the statistical significance). Concerning labor productivity, although the DRF takes on a functional form
similar to the other dependent variables, nomaximumdesirable intensity exists, and the overall impact of EUF on labor
productivity is slightly negative. This finding is not surprising, particularly where EUF pays for subsidies to firms (see
Bernini, Cerqua, & Pellegrini, 2017). If the investment productivity curve is decreasing, the reduction in the investment
cost generated by the subsidy drives the subsidized firm to invest in projects with lower than average productivity
(Bernini & Pellegrini, 2011).
Finally, using the combined results of EUF intensity on GDP, GVA, and employment from the fully specified model,
Figure 8 maps the NUTS-2 regions that received amounts of EUF transfers above the maximum desirable intensity
among those close to the forcing variable threshold for each EUF intensity definition. Considering the point esti-
mate (statistical significance) of the maximum desirable EUF intensity for the population normalization, we find 6 (8)
regions with an amount of transfers above the maximum desirable EUF intensity for our restricted sample of 156
regions.
5 ROBUSTNESS
We assess the validity and the robustness of our results adopting various specification tests. First, in our context we
cannot exclude that the intensity of the treatment is partially endogenous. For instance, regions using efficiently EUF
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TABLE 3 Continuous fuzzy RDD parametric estimates using alternative dependent variables: Deviation from group
means (Intensity= EUF/Population)
Dep. Var.: GVA
growth rate,
1994–2007
Dep. Var.:
Employment growth
rate, 1994–2007
Dep. Var.: Labor
productivity growth
rate, 1994–2007
Dummy Treatment (D) 2.087 3.132 −0.947
(1.074)* (0.858)*** (0.721)
Intensity −0.0115 −0.0005 −0.0065
(0.0049)** (0.0046) (0.0051)
Intensity Squared 0.0011 0.0011 −0.0004
(0.0002)*** (0.0002)*** (0.0002)**
Intensity Cubic −7.72e-06 −8.27e-06 3.09e-06
(1.90e-06)*** (2.02e-06)*** (2.00e-06)
Intensity*D 0.0257 0.0159 0.0039
(0.0058)*** (0.0051)*** (0.0056)
Intensity Squared*D −0.0011 −0.0011 0.0004
(0.0002)*** (0.0002)*** (0.0002)**
Intensity Cubic*D 7.42e-06 8.06e-06 −3.16e-06
(1.90e-06)*** (2.02e-06)*** (2.00e-06)
Polynomial order forcing variable 3 3 3
Other covariates Yes Yes Yes
Intensity parameters jointly stat. sign. (5%
level)
Yes Yes Yes
Maximum desirable intensity (stat. sign.) €295 €315 N/A
Maximum desirable intensity (point est.) €320 €340 N/A
R-squared 0.4132 0.6191 0.4462
Nb. of treated regions 44 44 44
Nb. of nontreated regions 112 112 112
Note: See notes of Table 2.
and growing faster might receive more funds after a middle-period allocation revision. The automatic decommitment
and the performance reserve proceed in this direction. These mechanisms reduce inefficiencies in EUF spending and
reward regionswithgoodperformance in the implementationofprograms.Ourestimates canbebiased in thepresence
of endogenous treatment intensity, and the effect of intensity overestimated. Therefore, we also use an instrumental
variables (IV) approach for attenuating this potential issue.15
The IV identification strategy was based on the institutional context that determines the allocation of funds across
Member States and regions. Following the suggestion ofmany authors (e.g., Bodenstein&Kemmerling, 2011; Charron,
2016), the identification of the aid intensity is based on a two-stage process: in the first stage, the amount of resources
allocated to each country is identified by some clear and observable features such as eligible population, regional pros-
perity, national prosperity, and severity of structural unemployment for Ob. 1 and 2, as declared in the Article 7 of
Council Regulation 1260/1999 of 21 June 1999. These indicators, which are calculated as an average of three years
before the programming period, are exogenous in our context. On the other hand, given that in the second stage the
bargainingbetweennational and regional authorities occurs bothbefore andafter the start of theprogrammingperiod,
15 To do so, we replace assumption A3 with assumption A3b: the instruments satisfy the following conditions: (i) they are weakly exogenous in the sense that
they are uncorrelated with the error term; (ii) they are correlated with the endogenous intensity variable after conditioning on the other covariates Z; and
(iii) they are uncorrelated with the dependent term except through the explanatory variable (again, conditioning on Z). The use of the instruments makes the
treatment intensity as if randomly assigned.
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F IGURE 8 Results by maximum desirable intensity (using the fully specified model results) [Color figure can be
viewed at wileyonlinelibrary.com]
this raises an endogeneity issue. By using the variables that identify the “transparent procedures” of allocation before
the programming period as instruments, we can break the “institutional” component of the intervention from the bar-
gaining relationship that depends on a range of regional features (quality of administration, the regional development
strategies, andmore), which are the fundamental sources of endogeneity in the equation.
As instruments, we use a dummy for the cohesion fund countries, the forcing variable relative to the country level,
and the share of population relative to the countrywide population, with all covariates measured in 1994.16 These
variables should capture exogenous effects on EUF regional intensity as, after controlling for the covariates Z, the
instruments should only affect the outcome variable via their effect on the treatment intensity. Indeed, the share of
the relative population is a good approximation of the potential EUF share of the region; whereas the share of GDP is
a correction factor. We present the results of the fully specified model when using the IV estimation in Table A1 in the
Appendix. Looking at the combined results of EUF intensity on GDP, GVA, and employment, we find that themaximum
desirable EUF intensity is slightly lower than the one reported in the main analysis (€310 for the point estimate and
€270 for the statistical significance).
We then check whether our results change substantially using the beginning of period GDP normalization
(EUF/GDP, 1994). The results for all model specifications and dependent variables are reported in Tables A2 and A3
in the Appendix. These estimates lead to qualitatively similar results, while the number of regions receiving transfers
above themaximum desirable threshold decreases to 5 (6).
16 The choice of the instruments is based on the indicators declared in the Article 7 of Council Regulation 1260/1999, after an identification and testing
procedure: the dummy variable for the cohesion fund countries and the forcing variable relative to the country level are related to national and regional
prosperity, and the share of population relative to the countrywide population is related to the share of eligible population, with all covariates measured in
1994. As the endogenous variable also appears in the squared and cubic form, we follow the approach proposed byWooldridge (2010) and add the quadratic
and cubic terms of the instruments as additional instruments before carrying out the IV regression.
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We also need to check that the results do not depend on the use of the whole period 1994–2006 instead of split-
ting the period into 1994–1999 and 2000–2006. After selecting a restricted sample (as in the main analysis, we have
dropped the lowest quarter for treated regions in terms of the initial level of per capita GDP and the upper quarter
for the nontreated regions), we estimate the parametric RDD with five different model specifications. This test also
allows us to check whether the fewOb. 1 status changes between the two programming periods had an impact on our
results.17 We find that the maximum desirable intensity is generally larger than the one reported in the main analysis,
but this difference changes the final status of only a few regions. The results are reported in Table A4 in the Appendix.
Spatial correlation can bias the estimation of ourmodels. As data indicate the presence of amoderate spatial corre-
lation across regional GDP growth rates, we reestimate the models under the hypothesis that the errors are spatially
correlated.18 However, the results using the spatial error model and two different spatial weight matrices (Euclidean
distance and rook contiguity) confirm the concave relationship between GDP growth and EUF intensity and conse-
quently the presence of a maximum desirable intensity. The results are reported in Table A5 in the Appendix. Besides,
asOb. 1 fundsmay be used to finance public infrastructure, generating not only local effects on the treated regions but
also spillovers to neighboring regions, we followBecker et al. (2010) and test whether this leads to a downward-bias of
the Ob. 1 treatment intensity effect estimates. Therefore, we exclude untreated regions sharing a border with at least
oneOb. 1 region. Results are reported in Table A6 and do not differ significantly from ourmain estimates.
Lastly,wealso check the results donotdependon theexclusionof the25percent of regionswhose level of per capita
GDP in the period 1988–1990was far away from the threshold. Nevertheless, the addition of these observations does
not modify much the estimates. The results are reported in Table A7 in the Appendix.
6 CONCLUSIONS
The intensity of EUF transfers is highly heterogeneous across regions, evenwithin the same country. This study focuses
on the estimation of the response of average annual GDP per capita growth to changes in the intensity of regional EUF
transfers. We use an original regional data set, which overcomes some of the data issues in the past and which is fully
coherentwith Structural FundsRegulations for 1994–1999 and2000–2006.Wepropose a newmethod for estimating
the effects of intensity on growth, extending the RDD framework to the case of continuous treatment.
The results indicate a positive effect on average of EUF transfers on regional growth. The most interesting aspect
is that the estimated conditional intensity-growth function is concave in our analysis interval and presents a maxi-
mum value, estimated in around €305–€340 per capita. After this value, themarginal efficiency of transfers is negative
and statistically negligible. The larger the per capita transfers are, the smaller the regional growth rate. Therefore,
these funds could have been allocated to other regions without reducing the effect for the single regions and plausi-
bly increasing the effect on the other disadvantaged regions, particularly to those with sufficient human capital and
good-enough institutions (see Becker et al., 2013).
Extending our results to all 208 regions,wefind that 11 regions, accounting for 11percent of the total EUF, received
more than €340. In theory, if the contribution to these regions would have been reduced up to €340 per capita, the EU
would have saved 5.1 billion Euros that could have been used to further help other least developed regions. Consid-
ering the results obtained from using the IV specification and the GDP normalization, we find that the EU might have
saved 7.4 and 8.0 billion Euros, respectively. Although these results are in line with the ones reported in Becker et al.
17 SomeOb. 1 regions for the 1994–1999 programming periodwere phased-out regions in the following programming period: “Highlands and the Islands” and
“Northern Ireland” in the U.K., “Southern and Eastern Region” in Ireland, “Flevoland” in the Netherlands, “Hainaut” in Belgium, “Corse” in France, “Molise” in
Italy, “Lisboa” in Portugal, and “Cantabria” in Spain. Someother regionswere classified asOb. 1 only in the 2000–2006 programming period: “SouthYorkshire,”
“Cornwall and Isles of Scilly,” and “WestWales and The Valley” in the U.K. and “Itä-Suomi” in Finland. As the per capita GDP of Ob. 1 regions becomes higher
than 75 percent of the EU average, phasing-in or phasing-out transitional programs are put in place, reducing the amount of funds available to former Ob. 1
regions (Di Cataldo, 2017).
18 The specification of the spatial process for the regression error terms suggests a particular covariance structure or pattern of spatial autocorrelation
(Anselin, 2006).
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(2012), we find that the concavity in the DRF is more prominent and a that smaller number of regions have exceeded
themaximum desirable level of transfers. Therefore, our overall view on the EU regional policy is more positive, as the
practical application of the policy is closer with its empirical maximum obtainable result.
The case of aminimum amount of funds is more complex. Signals hint that the effects are negligible for low levels of
treatment, but amore comprehensive analysis is needed.
In summary, the empirical determination of the European regional policy is not so distant from themaximizing pro-
cess implied by our model. However, our analysis demonstrates room for improving the allocation of EUF transfers
among European regions, particularly reducing the transfers to regions where the transfer intensity is above the max-
imum desirable level. A reallocation of EU transfers from 11–15 regions (the 5–7 percent of total number of regions)
to other less developed regions could be efficient and could strengthen regional convergence. Nevertheless, a great
deal of caution should be exerted in a mechanical application of these results to the policy. This is based on the follow-
ing two considerations. First, as we investigate the average impact of the EUF across Member States, our findings do
not exclude the presence of idiosyncratic factors allowing for constant or increasing returns to investment for specific
countries and regions. Second, the EUF transfers may have also other objectives apart from regional growth. Portions
of the high EUF intensity of certain regionsmay be devoted to fulfilling such diverse objectives, leading to a violation of
the empirical relationship between EUF intensity and growth.
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APPENDIX A
ROBUSTNESS CHECKS TABLES
TABLE A1 Continuous fuzzy RDD parametric estimates using the instrumental variables approach: Deviation from
groupmeans (Intensity= EUF/Population)
Dep. Var.: GDP per
capita compound
growth rate,
1994–2007
Dep. Var.: GVA
growth rate,
1994–2007
Dep. Var.:
Employment
growth rate,
1994–2007
Dep. Var.: Labor
productivity
growth rate,
1994–2007
Dummy Treatment (D) 2.262 2.266 2.057 0.487
(1.157)* (1.155)** (0.762)*** (1.006)
Intensity −0.0196 0.0034 0.0180 −0.0042
(0.0182) (0.0230) (0.0141) (0.0206)
Intensity Squared 0.0015 0.0014 0.0008 −0.0001
(0.0008)* (0.0008)* (0.0005) (0.0007)
Intensity Cubic −0.00001 −0.00001 −6.50e-06 −6.70e-07
(7.87e-06) (7.56e-06)* (5.44e-06) (6.60e-06)
Intensity*D 0.0247 0.0080 −0.0003 −0.0062
(0.0175) (0.0206) (0.0138) (0.0187)
Intensity Squared*D −0.0016 −0.0015 −0.0008 0.0001
(0.0008)* (0.0009)* (0.0006) (0.0008)
Intensity Cubic*D 0.00001 0.00001 6.06e-06 1.12e-06
(8.09e-06) (7.83e-06)* (5.68e-06) (6.77e-06)
Polynomial order forcing variable 3 3 3 3
Other covariates Yes Yes Yes Yes
Intensity parameters jointly stat.
sign. (5% level)
Yes Yes Yes Yes
Maximum desirable intensity
(stat. sign.)
€190 €210 €270 N/A
Maximum desirable intensity
(point est.)
€250 €285 €310 N/A
Nb. of treated regions 44 44 44 44
Nb. of nontreated regions 112 112 112 112
Note: Clustered standard errors at the country level in parentheses. The polynomial functions are allowed to have different
parameters to the left and the right of the threshold. The estimates are based on the 75% of the sample closest to the Ob.
1 assignment threshold (we exclude the lower quarter for the treated regions and the higher quarter for the non-treated
regions). As instruments, we use a dummy for the cohesion fund countries, the forcing variable relative to the country level,
and the share of population relative to the country-wide population, with all covariates measured in 1994.
***P< 0.01, **P< 0.05, *P< 0.1.
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TABLE A2 Continuous fuzzy RDD parametric estimates: Deviation from groupmeans (Intensity= EUF/GDP 1994)
Dependent variable: GDP per capita compound growth rate, 1994–2007
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5)
Dummy Treatment (D) 0.266 0.786 1.066 1.235 1.667
(0.394) (0.597) (0.644)* (0.945) (0.992)*
Intensity – – 52.295 64.569 −137.226
(27.116)* (33.152)* (118.973)
Intensity Squared – – – −6,733 257,557
(3,481)* (70,917)***
Intensity Cubic – – – 121,990 −3.78e+07
(130,475) (1.31e+07)**
Intensity*D – – – – 178.663
(118.883)
Intensity Squared*D – – – – −265,896
(70,722)***
Intensity Cubic*D – – – – 3.81e+07
(1.31e+07)**
Polynomial order forcing variable 1 3 3 3 3
Other covariates Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Intensity parameters jointly stat. sign. (5% level) – – No Yes Yes
Maximum desirable intensity (stat. sign.) N/A N/A N/A 0.0150 0.0135
Maximum desirable intensity (point est.) N/A N/A N/A 0.0215 0.0190
R-squared 0.1196 0.1083 0.1367 0.2328 0.2771
Nb. of treated regions 44 44 44 44 44
Nb. of nontreated regions 112 112 112 112 112
Note: See notes of Table 2.
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TABLE A3 Continuous fuzzy RDD parametric estimates using alternative dependent variables: Deviation from
groupmeans (Intensity= EUF/GDP 1994)
Dep. Var.: GVA
growth rate,
1994–2007
Dep. Var.:
Employment growth
rate, 1994–2007
Dep. Var.: Labor
productivity growth
rate, 1994–2007
Dummy Treatment (D) 2.945 4.312 −1.375
(1.302)** (1.044)*** (0.784)*
Intensity −147.367 70.397 −149.522
(117.422) (95.170) (108.938)
Intensity Squared 353,484 367,846 −90,500
(62,095)*** (76,120)*** (78,259)
Intensity Cubic −4.93e-07 −5.26e-07 1.31e-07
(1.22e-07)*** (1.41e-07)*** (1.44e-07)
Intensity*D 269.722 108.222 72.611
(112.676)** (93.769) (105.508)
Intensity Squared*D −360,102 −374,755 89,976
(62,324)*** (76,661)*** (78,097)
Intensity Cubic*D 4.93e-07 5.26e-07 −1.30e-07
(1.22e-07)*** (1.41e-07)*** (1.44e-07)
Polynomial order forcing variable 3 3 3
Other covariates Yes Yes Yes
Intensity parameters jointly stat. sign.
(5% level)
Yes Yes Yes
Maximum desirable intensity (stat. sign.) 0.0200 0.0255 N/A
Maximum desirable intensity (point est.) 0.0255 0.0290 N/A
R-squared 0.3478 0.5583 0.4379
Nb. of treated regions 44 44 44
Nb. of nontreated regions 112 112 112
Note: See notes of Table 2.
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TABLE A4 Continuous fuzzy RDD parametric estimates: Deviation from group means (Intensity = EUF/
Population)—Two different programming periods
Dependent variable: GDP per capita compound growth rate 1994–2000 (for PP 1994–1999) and 2000–2007 (for PP
2000–2006)
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5)
Dummy Treatment (D) 0.180 0.648 0.875 1.127 1.331
(0.398) (0.517) (0.583) (0.915) (0.948)
Intensity – – 0.0036 0.0057 −0.0088
(0.0024) (0.0025)** (0.0053)
Intensity Squared – – – −1.39e-06 0.0004
(0.00002) (0.0001)***
Intensity Cubic – – – −7.56e-08 −1.88e-06
(8.13e-08) (1.04e-06)*
Intensity*D – – – – 0.0153
(0.0059)***
Intensity Squared*D – – – – −0.0004
(0.0001)***
Intensity Cubic*D – – – – 1.79e-06
(1.05e-06)*
Polynomial order forcing variable 1 3 3 3 3
Other covariates 1 1 1 1 1
Intensity parameters jointly stat. sign. (5% level) – – 0 0 1
Maximum desirable intensity (stat. sign.) N/A N/A N/A €295 €275
Maximum desirable intensity (point est.) N/A N/A N/A €375 €365
R-squared 0.2177 0.2274 0.2485 0.2628 0.2870
Nb. of treated regions 83 83 83 83 83
Nb. of nontreated regions 225 225 225 225 225
Note: Clustered standard errors at the NUTS-2 level in parentheses. The polynomial functions are allowed to have different
parameters to the left and the right of the threshold. The estimates are based on the 75% of the sample closest to the Ob. 1
assignment threshold (we exclude the lower quarter for the treated regions and the higher quarter for the nontreated regions).
Other pretreatment covariates include population, population density, percentage of over 65, share in the service sector, share
in the agricultural sector, productivity, and employment rate among 15–64 years old.
***P< 0.01, **P< 0.05, *P< 0.1.
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TABLE A5 Continuous fuzzy RDD parametric estimates using the Spatial ErrorModel: Deviation from groupmeans
(Intensity= EUF/Population)
Dependent variable: GDP per capita compound growth rate, 1994–2007
(1) (2) (3) (4)
Dummy Treatment (D) −0.383 0.062 0.402 0.620
(0.647) (0.733) (0.591) (0.600)
Intensity 0.0026 −0.0132 0.0079 −0.0073
(0.0031) (0.0050)*** (0.0025)*** (0.0049)
Intensity Squared −0.00001 0.0006 −0.00003 0.0007
(0.00001) (0.0002)*** (0.00002)* (0.0002)***
Intensity Cubic −1.06e-08 −3.90e-06 −1.54e-07 −5.81e-06
(7.78e-08) (1.82e-06)** (8.93e-08)* (1.97e-06)***
Intensity*D – 0.0187 – 0.0159
(0.0048)*** (0.0051)***
Intensity Squared*D – −0.0006 – −0.0007
(0.0002)*** (0.0002)***
Intensity Cubic*D – 3.78e-06 – 5.61e-06
(1.81e-06)** (1.98e-06)***
𝜌 (rho) 4.221 3.159 0.255 0.226
(1.464)*** (1.037)*** (0.097)*** (0.102)**
Spatial Matrix Euclidean Euclidean Rook Rook
Polynomial order forcing variable 3 3 3 3
Other covariates Yes Yes Yes Yes
Intensity parameters jointly stat. sign. (5% level) No Yes Yes Yes
Maximum desirable intensity (statistical significance) N/A €245 €275 €270
Maximum desirable intensity (point estimate) €300 €310 €305 €305
Nb. of treated regions 44 44 44 44
Nb. of nontreated regions 112 112 112 112
Note: Heteroskedasticity-robust standard errors in parentheses. The polynomial functions are allowed to have different
parameters to the left and the right of the threshold. We implemented the Spatial Error Model using the Stata modules
spmat.ado and spivreg.ado (see Drukker, Prucha, & Raciborski, 2013). The estimates are based on the 75% of the sample clos-
est to the Ob. 1 assignment threshold (we exclude the lower quarter for the treated regions and the higher quarter for the
nontreated regions). Other covariates include population, population density, percentage of over 65, share in the service sec-
tor, share in the agricultural sector, productivity, and employment rate among 15–64 years old, with all covariatesmeasured in
1994.
***P< 0.01, **P< 0.05, *P< 0.1.
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TABLE A6 Continuous fuzzy RDD parametric estimates with spatial exclusion: Deviation from group means (Inten-
sity= EUF/Population)
Dependent variable: GDP per capita compound growth rate, 1994–2007
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5)
Dummy Treatment (D) 0.375 0.636 0.713 0.637 1.302
(0.453) (0.610) (0.539) (0.640) (0.697)*
Intensity – – 0.0050 0.0078 −0.0082
(0.0025)** (0.0028)*** (0.0061)
Intensity Squared – – – −0.00003 0.0015
(0.0002)* (0.0004)***
Intensity Cubic – – – −1.19e-07 −0.00002
(9.88e-08) (6.51e-06)***
Intensity*D – – – – 0.0171
(0.0065)***
Intensity Squared*D – – – – −0.0016
(0.0004)***
Intensity Cubic*D – – – – 0.00002
(6.51e-06)***
Polynomial order forcing variable 1 3 3 3 3
Other covariates Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Intensity parameters jointly stat. sign. (5% level) – – Yes Yes Yes
Maximum desirable intensity (stat. sign.) N/A N/A N/A €265 €270
Maximum desirable intensity (point est.) N/A N/A N/A €300 €305
R-squared 0.1462 0.1377 0.2081 0.3042 0.3686
Nb. of treated regions 44 44 44 44 44
Nb. of nontreated regions 90 90 90 90 90
Note: Clustered standard errors at the country level in parentheses. The polynomial functions are allowed to have different
parameters to the left and the right of the threshold. The estimates are based on the restricted sample with the additional
exclusion of all non-Ob. 1 regions sharing a border with at least oneOb. 1 region. Other covariates include population, popula-
tion density, percentage of over 65, share in the service sector, share in the agricultural sector, productivity, and employment
rate among 15–64 years old, with all covariates measured in 1994.
***P< 0.01, **P< 0.05, *P< 0.1.
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TABLE A7 Continuous fuzzy RDD parametric estimates: Deviation from group means (Intensity = EUF/
Population)—using the full sample
Dependent variable: GDP per capita compound growth rate, 1994–2007
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5)
Dummy Treatment (D) 0.567 0.429 0.606 1.141 1.364
(0.290)* (0.394) (0.428) (0.667)* (0.684)**
Intensity – – 0.0034 0.0040 −0.0147
(0.0016)** (0.0022)* (0.0058)**
Intensity Squared – – – −0.00002 0.0009
(0.00002) (0.0003)***
Intensity Cubic – – – 4.70e-08 −7.22e-06
(4.66e-08) (3.70e-06)
Intensity*D – – – – 0.0179
(0.0056)***
Intensity Squared*D – – – – −0.0010
(0.0003)***
Intensity Cubic*D – – – – 7.28e-06
(3.70e-06)**
Polynomial order forcing variable 1 3 3 3 3
Other covariates Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Intensity parameters jointly stat. sign. (5% level) – – Yes Yes Yes
Maximum desirable intensity (stat. sign.) N/A N/A N/A €215 €205
Maximum desirable intensity (point est.) N/A N/A N/A €390 €300
R-squared 0.1229 0.1736 0.2023 0.2129 0.2700
Nb. of treated regions 56 56 56 56 56
Nb. of non-treated regions 147 147 147 147 147
Note: Clustered standard errors at the country level in parentheses. The polynomial functions are allowed to have different
parameters to the left and the right of the threshold. The estimates are based on the whole sample except for the outliers (the
criterion for outliers is to have received funds above the average plus three times the standard deviation of the respective
treatment group). Other covariates include population, population density, percentage of over 65, share in the service sector,
share in the agricultural sector, productivity, and employment rate among 15–64 years old, with all covariates measured in
1994.
***P< 0.01, **P< 0.05, *P< 0.1.
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APPENDIX B
RELATIONSHIP BETWEENPOPULATIONANDTHE EUF INTENSITY
F IGURE B1 Population and the EUF intensity (full and restricted sample) [Color figure can be viewed at wileyon-
linelibrary.com]
Note: Histogram-style conditional mean with 30 bins by Ob. 1 status obtained using the Stata module “cmogram.ado.”
For the interpolation line we used a local linear smoothing function.
